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W, it would seem that the provision for these payments was inserted in
the judgment at least partly with the idea of having H pay off the part
of the debt due by W. When considered in this light, it becomes plain
that this provision was also one for the payment of debt, although it
may, as the court suggested, have also contemplated providing the wife
with a house in which to live.
It is submitted that the court erred in upholding the citation for contempt. Although H consented that failure to pay might subject him to
contempt proceedings under the statute relating to alimony without
divorce, his consent could not give a court jurisdiction to imprison him
for debt. He might just as well, as Justice Seawell suggests, "have
agreed that a default in the payment of the debt should subject him to
punishment under any criminal statute which may be found in the

books."16

JOEL DENTON.

Liability of Sureties-Extent to Which Liability Established Against
Principal Determines the Liability of Surety
Action by creditor against both principal and surety. The principal
had made a statement admitting liability but such statement was made
after default and without the principal knowing of his rights. Held:
The surety has the right to stand on his contract and the statement of
the principal is not binding on the surety. 1
Assuming that the surety has no defenses of his own the extent to
which he may use defenses of the debtor is extremely limited. Ordinarily
any defense, not personal to the debtor, is available to the surety in an
action on the surety bond2 but some cases seem to hold that a surety
cannot make use of a defense (of the debtor) which the principal waives
or otherwise precludes himself from making 5 While this doctrine does
not apply to cases involving fraud or collusion between debtor and
creditor, 4 it does seem to extend the liability of the surety, for if a
'o Seawell, J., dissenting in Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N. C. 181, 192, 22
S. E. (2d) 576, 584 (1942), cited supra note 1.

Chozen Confections, Inc. v. Johnson, 221 N. C. 224, 19 S. E. (2d) 866 (1942).
'The Peoples Bank v. Loven, 17,2 N. C. 666, 90 S. E. 948 (1916) ; United States

Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Town of Dothan, 174 Ala. 480, 56 So. 953 (1911);

Bear v. Duval Lumber Co., 112 Fla. 240, 150 So. 614 (1933); Greenwood v.
Greenwood, 44 Ga. App. 848, 163 S. E. 318 (1932); Benson v. Alleman, 220 Iowa

731, 263 N. W. 305 (1935); Iowa Bonding & Casualty Co. v. Wagner Co., 203

Iowa 179, 210 N. W. 775 (1926); City National Bank of Columbus, Ohio v.
Jordan, 139 Iowa 499, 117 N. W. 758 (1908) ; State v. Duggan, 102 W. Va. 312,
135 S. E. 270 (1926).
'Burwell v. First National Bank, 86 Ind. App. 581, 159 N. E. 15 (1928);
Union State Bank v. A7herican Surety Co., 324 Mo. 438, 23 S. W. (2d) 1038
(1930); M. S. Cohn Gravel Co. v. Southern Surety Co., 129 Okla. 171, 264 Pac.

206 (1928) ; Rathgaber v. Horton, 52 S. D. 436, 218 N. W. 148 (1928).

'City National Bank of Columbus, Ohio v. Jordan, 139 Iowa 499, 117 N. W.
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debtor has a defense and takes advantage of it then in many instances the
surety will be discharged. Whether or not a waiver of defense is to be
binding on the surety should depend on the nature of the defense. There
are defenses which go to the validity of the principal contract, e.g., no
consideration, illegality. If there is a failure of consideration the surety
may talke advantage of this fact as a defense5 even though the principal
has not set it up first. To permit a waiver of this defense by the principal to bind the surety will in effect change the surety's contract upon
which he has a right to stand. It will deprive the principal of the use
of the property from which it was contemplated that the principal would
secure funds with which to pay his debt. The surety's liability would be
for a contract which either never existed in the case of total failure of
consideration or only partially existed in the case of partial failure of
consideration. Where the defense is illegality the courts will refuse to
grant a plaintiff their aid.6 And to permit a waiver of such defense
would in effect allow a plaintiff to recover upon a contract in violation
of law. Some defenses arise, not from the nature of the bargain, but
from the nature of the parties, e.g., infancy. This defense, if the debtor
is the infant, is not available to the surety even after the principal sets
it up, 7 and rightly so, for this may be the very reason the creditor secured a surety before parting with his goods. However, there is an
exception to this rule where the infant both renounces the contract and
returns the consideration so that the creditor is placed in status quo ;8
but proof on this issue is on the surety and is in the end a failure of
consideration. Then there are cases which present defenses arising because of wrongs perpetrated on one of the parties, e.g., fraud or duress.
It is not within the scope of this note to deal with defenses which accrue
to the surety in his own right such as where the fraud is on him. Where
there is fraud on the principal the surety may not avail himself of the
defense unless the principal first sets it up.9 If, then, this defense is
waived by the principal it will not be available to the surety. The reasoning of the court is that the defense of fraud ispersonal to the principal
and he may waive the fraud and insist on enforcement of the contract
and the surety may not make this election to set up the defense for the
principal. But this reasoning seems to be fallacious for the surety has

758 (1908) ; Taylor-Fichter Steel Const. Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y.,
258 App. Div. 235, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 218 (1940).

Forsythe v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 130 Misc. Rep. 569, 224
N. Y. Supp. 330 (1927).

a Walker v. Graham, 228 Ala. 574, 154 So. 806 (1934); Schur v. Johnson, 2

Cal.

App. (2d) 680, 38 P. (2d) 844 (1935).

McKee v. Harwood Automobile Co., 204 Ind. 233, 183 N. E. 646 (1933).
' Lagerquist v. Bankers' Bond & Mortgage Guaranty Co., 201 Iowa 430, 205
N. W. 977, 43 A. L. R. 585 (1933).

*Burwell v. First Nat. Bank, 86 Ind. App. 581, 159 N. E. 15 (1928) ; Rathga-

her v. Horton, 52 S. D. 436, 218 N. W. 148 (1928).
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the right to stand on his contract.' This would include the right to have
the contract on which he became surety as it was when he became surety
which would include the defense of fraud available to the principal. The
defense of duress should likewise be treated. Any other view allows
the creditor to profit -by his own wrong. And even if the principal is
willing to waive defenses of fraud or duress as to himself and insist on
enforcement of the contract the creditor should not be allowed to retain
the additional security of the surety.
Assuming again that the surety has no defenses of his own, and
assuming further (1) that there are admissions by the principal of his
liability under a contract, (2) that the creditor has secured a judgment
against the debtor, then to what extent are these binding on the surety?
First, as to admissions of liability by the principal. The availability
of an admission of the principal against the surety should be determined
by the nature of the admission. If the admission is urged merely as a
waiver of defense, then the above discussion of waiver should be applied.
But, if the admission be urged as proof that there never was any defense
or that it does not now exist, a different doctrine should be applicable.
While the surety may not object tQ the principal remaining bound,11 he
has a right to stand on his own contract.' 2 In other words a surety is
not bound by what a principal says he has or has not done but on the
contrary he. is bound by what the principal actually does.' 3 The outcome
of a case involving liability of surety, then will be determined by proof
or disproof of the alleged liability of the principal. In this connection
the competency of evidence will go a long way toward controlling the
outcome of the case, and it is at once apparent how much influence an
admission of liability by the principal will have if such admissions are
competent. It is common to find a court saying that admissions of indebtedness by a debtor are admissible against his surety, 1 4 and there are
cases which contain general statements that admissions of the principal
are not admissible against the surety. 15 But from an examination of the
'0 Randall v. Gunter, 181 Miss. 332, 179 So. 362 (1938); Cohen v. Hurwitz,
142 N. Y. Supp. 305 (1913); State v. Duggan, 102 W. Va. 312, 135 S. E. 270

(1926).

"'United States v. Shea-Adamson Co., 21 F. Supp. 831 (D. Minn. 1937) ; Van
Kirk v. Adler, 111 Ala. 113, 20 So. 336 (1896) ; M. S. Cohn Gravel Co. v. Southern

Surety Co., 129 Okla. 171, 264 Pac. 206 (1928).

" Randall v. Gunter, 181 Miss. 332, 179 So. 362 (1938) ; Cohen v. Hurwitz, 142

N. Y. Supp. 305 (1913) ; State v. Duggan, 102 W. Va. 312, 135 S. E. 270 (1926).

"- Chelmsford Co. v. Demerest, 7 Gray (Mass.) 1 (1856); Kellum v. Clark,
97 N. Y. 390 (1884); Hatch v. Elkins, 65 N. Y. 489 (1875).
"' Graves v. Aetna Insurance Co. of Hartford, Conn., 215 Ala. 250, 110 So. 390
(1927) ; Smith v. Republic Underwriters, 152 Kan. 305, 103 P. (2d) 858 (1940) ;
Atlas Shoe Co. v. Bloom, 209 Mass. 563, 95 N. E. 952 (1911) ; Cook County Liquor
Co. v. Brown, 31 Okla. 614, 122 Pac. 167 (1912) ; W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Graham,

(2d) 407, 103 P. (2d) 1076 (1940).
4 Wash.
1

United States v. American Surety Co. of New York, 56 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A.

2d,1932) ; Chicago Portrait Co. v. O'Nean, 6 Ga. App. 425, 65 S. E. 161 (1909) ;
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cases admissibility seems to be determined with reference to the time the
statement was made, i.e., if the statement was made after a breach or
default by the debtor such admissions are not competent evidence,' 6
while if the statement was made during the life of the contract it is
admissible. 17 The admissions after default are, in a sense, treated as
hearsay,' 8 and the admissions made during the formation of the contract
as part of the res gestae. 19 The distinction between admissions after
default and those made during the formation of the contract is understandable under the res gestae doctrine, But the reason for admitting
statements made between the time of completion of the transaction and
the time of default is less clear, for there appears no reason to make
such statements binding on the surety since the principal is not-the agent
of the surety. And also there should be,.a rule that the principal may not
act to the prejudice of his surety. Courts seem to follow the reasoning
that a principal is less likely to make a statement admitting liability before default than after. But it would seem to be the reverse, for why
would a person admit that he is liable as of the time of such statement
more quickly than he would admit liability that is to become absolute in
the future? A creditor should have to prove that a debt is owing from
the principal by original evidence excluding statements of the principal
20
made after the transacting of the business.
Great Western Life Assurance Co. v. Shumway, 25 N. D. 268, 141 N. W. 479
v. Goldberg, 190 Wash. 210, 67 P. (2d) 328 (1937).
(1913) ; Armstrong
"oGraves v. Aetna Insurance Co. of Hartford, Conn., 215 Ala. 250, 110 So. 396
(1927) (Admissions of indebtedness by principal after being declared in default
held not binding on surety); Atlanta Journal Co. v. Knowles, 24 Ga. App. 745,
102 S. E. 191, (1920) (An admission of a principal that an account was correct,
due, and unpaid -held not admissible in a suit against the surety, where made after
the principal had been dismissed as the plaintiff's agent ; Citizen's National Bankof Leighton v. Kupres, 106 Pa. Super. 164, 161 Atl. 466 (1932) (In action on note
wherein defendant obtained rule to open judgment by confession, defendant's
declarations, in' absence of guarantor on day after alleged fraud, held properly
excluded).
"' United States v. American Surety Co. of New York, 56 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A.
2d, 1932) (Admissions made by principal in'transacting business for which surety
is bound are competent evidence against surety) ; Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Cassidy, 275
Ill. 462, 114 N. E. 181 (1916) (Admissions made in regular course of the guaranteed business" by the president and general manager of a corporation as to the
amount of its indebtedness to a guarantee held competent against guarantors in
suit on guaranty, although made shortly before bankruptcy).
" Padavic v. Vanderboom, 207 Ill. App. 600 (1917) (A statement made by the
maker of a note to a collector for the payee, out of the presence of the surety, at
the time of presentation of the note for payment, that he would fix the matter with
the payee, is purely hearsay as to the surety). However, notice that Illinois holds
admissions by the principal made in regular course of business to be admissible.
Schovill Mfg. Co. v. Cassidy, 275 Ill. 462, 114 N. E. 181 (1916), cited supra
note 17.
" Dietrich v. Dr. Koch Vegetable Tea Co., 56 Okla. 636, 156 Pac. 188 (1916)
(Declarations and conduct of the principal become a part of the res gestae ind
admissible against surety, where they were made during the transaction-of the
business for which the surety is bound, but not otherwise).
10 See Hatch v. Elkins, 65 N. Y. 489, 496 (1875).
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Second, as to the effect of a judgment against the principal in an
action against the surety. Here too, there is an apparent division of
authority. Some courts seem to hold that judgment against the principal is not binding on the surety 2 ' while other cases hold it to be only
prima facie evidence of a breach by the principal, 22 and still others hold
that the judgment is conclusive as to the liability of the surety. 23 An
analysis of these cases will reveal that judgment is binding on the surety
if he is surety on a bond such as a replevin bond, while if the suretyship
contract is for the faithful performance of a contract, i.e., business deal,
then judgment against the principal is only prima facie evidence of a
breach of the principal contract. This distinction is justified, for where
a person is surety on a replevin bond usually breach of the bond depends
simply on the existence of a judgment against the principal. Judgments
rendered on business deals are determined only on evidence produced in
court by the parties. Those cases which hold that a judgment against the
principal is not binding on the surety deal with exceptions to the two
rules above, such as where the defense is payment, 24 where the surety is
entitled to defend in his own right,2 5 or where the surety obligation is
26
for less than the judgment.
While set-offs and counterclaims are not defenses it may be well to
point out here that a surety, when used alone, may not avail himself of
a set-off or counterclaim that a principal might use.2 7 This doctrine
seems to be based upon the fact that a counterclaim is an independent
right of action belonging to the principal which he may or may not wish
to invoke. The doctrine, however, has been extended to prohibit the
surety from counterclaiming for usurious payments by the debtor2 s but
North Carolina allows a surety to set-off such usurious payments.29 It
was also extended, in what appears to be a very poor decision, to a case
where the defendant was surety for the return of the purchase price and
the buyer had not exercised reasonable care in handling the purchased
" Speight Box & Panel Co. v. Ipock, 217 N. C. 375, 8 S. E. (2d) 243 (1940) ;
J. E. McCoy & Son v. Atkins, 172 Ark. 365, 288 S. W. 886 (1927); Randall v.
Gunter, 181 Miss. 332, 179 So. 362 (1938).
2 Moses v. United States, 166 U. S. 571, 600, 17 S. Ct. 682, 693, 41 L. ed. 1119,
1129 (1896) ; Sauer v. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co., 237 Mich. 697, 213 N. W.
98 (1927); see United States v. American Surety Co. of New York, 56 F. (2d)
734, 735 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
2" Brewer v. Kirk, 256 Ky. 822, 77 S. W. (2d) 34 (1935) ; Giatas v. Demoulas,
271 Mass. 51, 170 N. E. 921 (1930).
24 Randall v. Gunter, 181 Miss. 332, 179 So. 362 (1938) ; see Merrill v. Equitable

Surety Co. of N. Y., 131 Misc. 541., 227 N. Y. Supp. 266, 273 (1928).
" Speight Box & Panel Co. v. Ipock, 217 N. C. 375, 8 S. E. (2d) 243 (1940).

"Moses v. United States, 166 U. S.571, 600, 17 S.Ct. 682, 693, 41 L. ed. 1119,
112927 (1896) ; J. E. McCoy & Sons v. Atkins, 172 Ark. 365, 288 S.W. 886 (1927).
National Surety Co. v. George E. Breece Lumber Co., 60 F. (2d) 847 (C. C.
2

A. 10th, 1932).

" Savage v. Fox, 60 N. H. 17 (1880). Contra: Cole v. Hills, 44 N. H. 227
(1862).
" Peoples Bank v. Loven, 172 N. C. 666, 90 S.E. 948 (1916).
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goods, the court holding that the surety could not set off the amount
of damage to the goods caused by such negligent handling.
In Chozen Confections, Inc. v. Johnson3 l where the admission was
made by the principal after default and also without the principal having
knowledge of his rights, it is submitted that the North Carolina Supreme
Court has reached the only proper and just conclusion.
ROBERT R. BoND.
Graham v. Middleby, 213 Mass. 437, 100 N. E. 750, 43 L. R. A. (N.s.) 977

(1913).
1221 N. C. 224, 19 S. E. (2d) 866 (1942).

